### 1NC (3:00)

#### The kritik is a litmus test. The affirmative must justify the fundamental assumptions of the 1AC. Otherwise, you would vote negative on presumption since they don’t justify why we should change the status quo.

#### The affirmative takes on the role of an ‘expert’, justifying a vision of society and proposing policies to correct the problems of law. This discourse is the perfect example of the discourse of the University, which cloaks its desire for mastery and power underneath a veil of expertise.

Schroeder 02 Jeanne L. (Professor Schroeder practiced in corporate finance for 12 years as an associate at Cravath, Swaine & Moore and a partner at Milgrim Thomajan & Lee. Her scholarly interests range from commercial law doctrine to feminist jurisprudential theory. Her current work is on recent amendments to Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code and in developing a feminist theory of law and economics incorporating the political philosophy of G.W. F. Hegel and the psychoanalytic theories of Jacques Lacan. Her book on this subject, The Vestal and the Fasces: Hegel, Lacan, Property, and the Feminine, was published in 1998, and her second, The Triumph of Venus: The Erotics of the Market, was published in 2004) “The Stumbling Block: Freedom, Rationality, and Legal Scholarship” William & Mary Law Review Volume 44 Issue 1 Article 5 <http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1394&context=wmlr> JW

Specifically, Lacan developed his discourse theory in the aftermath of the Paris student riots of 1968. n363 He wished to chastise the self-styled radicals who claimed to be establishing a new "free" university. Lacan argued that these "radicals" were anything but. They, in fact, were policy scientists who spoke within the same discourse as the university they claimed to despise. n364 In the university's discourse, the addressor stands in the position of knowledge (S2) or expertise. n365 In contrast to the master, the expert does not claim authority purely by virtue of his position. He claims that he deserves his position because of his superior knowledge. He purports to have reasoned justification for where he is and what he does. n366 The expert addresses the "little a," the cause of desire. n367 Once again, in contrast to the master, the university expert claims purpose. He claims to inquire into society's goals (its desire) in order to propose policies designed to achieve these purposes. The [\*349] university expert, having identified an end, now "rationally" pro-poses means to achieve this end. The truth hidden under the veil of expertise is, however, the master. n368 The claim to expertise is a rationalization for the expert's imposition of her will. The claim to superior knowledge is a means of gaining and wielding power. n369 The purported inquiry into the ends of society and the promulgating of policies are really means to the end of controlling and manipulating others. The result of the university's discourse is the split subject. n370 The split subject is the one subjected to the expert's manipulation and who is thereby alienated from the enterprise. n371 Lacan argues that in the context of the actual university, one split subject is the student. n372 In the master's discourse, the result, the "little a," comes about through exclusion. It is, in a way, an unintended consequence. The master seeks to exclude the "little a" from his discourse, but by doing so, he causes the "little a" to function as the object of desire. n373 In contrast, the goal of the university's discourse is to produce a subject who obeys the policy set by the experts. n374 That is, the expert intends that his discourse produce a subject, whether or not the actual form this subject takes meets the expert's expectations. [\*350] Lacan believes that one speaking in the university discourse is indifferent to whether the expert speaker or the student addressed actually achieves a true understanding. n375 The professors care about their prestige in academia and in society, and students are merely a means to that end. Consequently, students become alienated from the whole enterprise, parroting back what their teachers tell them rather than seeking to create their own knowledge. In law, the split subjects are those who are to be manipulated by policy. The expert wishes to produce these subjects who will achieve the expert's goals, even if the expert does not consciously wish to alienate or "split" them. For example, Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler want legal rules to make people act as though they were economically rational. n376 Nevertheless, although the expert wants to produce certain types of subjects, the expert does not address these subjects directly. The expert does not ask the subjects what their goals are. The expert does not ask about their experience of the law to which they are subjected. Rather, the university's concern is "objective"-the goals ("little a") of society as a whole. The question is how to make the individuals who comprise society better achieve society's goals. In the name of a free society, policy science fundamentally mistrusts the freedom of its members.

#### The expansion of the University discourse destroys education and reduces the subject to an object.

Clarke 12 Matthew (Professor at University of New South Wales) “The Other Side of Education: A Lacanian Critique of Neoliberal Education Policy” Other Education: The Journal of Education Alternatives, Volume 1 Issue 1 p. 46-60 <http://www.othereducation.org/index.php/OE/article/view/27> JW

Neoliberal Education Policy: Discourses of Mastery Whilst recognizing that, as Stephen Ball puts it, neoliberalism “is one of those terms that is used so widely and so loosely that it is in danger of becoming meaningless” (2012, p. 3), I would argue that it is nonetheless a key term insofar as it references the colonisation of social and material life by particular politico-economic ideologies. Indeed, neoliberalism might well be defined as economic fundamentalism. As Jodi Dean puts it, “redefining social and ethical life in accordance with economic criteria and expectations, neoliberalism holds that human freedom is best achieved through the operation of markets” (2009, p. 51). Such economic fundamentalism has achieved ascendancy across a range of international contexts and a range of fields, including education, leading commentators to talk of a globalised neoliberal policy space in education. As Rizvi and Lingard argue, “just as a social imaginary of neoliberal globalization has been a central component in the creation of the global market, so it has been within the global field of education policy. A global field of education policy is now established” (2010, p. 67). Signature traits of this global “policy convergence” in education include a number of key overarching policy themes – accountability, competition, and privatization (Rancière, 2010, p. 19) – that are manifested in a number of intersecting educational policies typically pursued by neoliberal governments. These policies include the imposition of standardised curricula on schools, teachers and students, monitored by high-stakes testing regimes for students and performativity-oriented evaluation and accountability measures for schools and teachers. They also include the encouragement of more diverse forms of school provision in order to, to cite Michael Gove again (2012), “generate innovation, raise expectations, give parents choice and drive up standards through competition,” alongside managerialist-inspired policies, such as the devolution of budgetary responsibilities to principals. As suggested already, Lacanian discourse theory, and the two discourses of mastery, those of the master and the university in particular, provide powerful insights into contemporary globalized neoliberal policy discourses in education. The master’s discourse is associated with self-identity, self-assurance and control of others. The political analogy would be the absolute monarch who, like the domineering parent or teacher, must be obeyed because of who they are, not because their pronouncements are underpinned by valid knowledge (Sharpe & Boucher, 2010; Žižek, 2008). The master’s discourse is represented schematically as follows: 1) S1 \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ 4) $ 2) S2 → \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ ← 3) a In the master’s discourse, hegemonic and univocal master signifiers, S1, address and organize the field of discourse, S2. Yet this purported mastery relies on the concealment and repression of subjective division, $, whilst generating the by- product, a, the object of desire that is lost to the subject (Boucher, 2006). Lacan believed that modernity involved the displacement of the master’s discourse by the university discourse (Boucher, 2006), though the master’s discourse remains central insofar as it dominates the other three discourses (Clemens & Grigg, 2006). Critically, the displacement of the master’s discourse by that of the university should not lead us into thinking that power has been replaced by reason, as suggested in dominant liberal narratives: What Lacan recognizes in the university discourse is a new and reformed discourse of the master. In its elementary form, it is a discourse that is pronounced from the place of supposedly neutral knowledge, the truth of which (hidden below the bar) is Power, that is, the master signifier. The constitutive lie of this discourse is that it disavows its performative dimension; it always presents, for example, that which leads to a political decision, founded on power, as a simple insight into the state of things (or public polls, objective reports, and so on). (Zupančič, 2006, p. 168) A similar point is made by sociologist and political theorist, Colin Crouch, who highlights the technocratic aspirations of third-way politicians as they “try to put issues beyond the range of conflict and debate, and beyond the reach of difficult ethical choices” by substituting “rational,” “scientific” neoliberal economic theory for contingent and contestable political decision making. Such depoliticization has also been a marked feature of neoliberal education policies, underpinned by a discursive duopoly of instrumental and consensual discourses (Clarke, 2012). Yet as Crouch goes on to note, “these attempts must always fail, as it is not possible to put human life on a technocratic automatic pilot” (Crouch, 2011, pp. 91-92). The failure of such attempts is central to the university discourse, which is represented schematically as follows: 1) S2 \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ 4) S1 2) a → \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ ← 3) $ It is important to note that the university discourse is not tied to the institution we know as the university. Thus, commentators have also linked it to Stalin’s political regime – with its domination by expert knowledge embodied in official public discourses, addressing subjects as totalized, “authentic” revolutionary objects, whilst producing terrorized subjects as its by-product – as well as to the dominance of bureaucracy and consumerism in the contemporary world (Boucher, 2006; Dean, 2006; Sharpe & Boucher, 2010; Žižek, 2006, 2008). In each case, expert knowledge, disavowing its reliance on power, addresses the excluded remainder, attempting to incorporate it – and thus to enact and reproduce the knowledge system of S2 – within a completely sutured symbolic identity: the fully satisfied consumer; the fully integrated worker of the knowledge economy; the totally mobilized member of the socialist collective; the effective teacher. Yet ironically, this address can also be read as directed towards the subject solely in terms of its object-like qualities, or what Agamben refers to as “bare life” (1998), with no recognition of its orientation to any higher goals or purposes (Dean, 2006, p. 83). The hollowness of this attempt produces the repressed split subject, whilst simultaneously prompting the restless revolutionizing and ceaseless change that we see manifested in various forms, including capitalism’s excesses and crises, the ever-shifting bureaucratic performativity requirements of contemporary accountability regimes, and the lifelong learning demanded of today’s always unready educational subjects. We gain significant insights into neoliberal education policy discourses when they are read in terms of Lacan’s discourse of the university, particularly when we recall its links to the dominance of bureaucracy and consumerism in the twenty-first century. Specifically, such policies can be understood as dominated by, on the one hand, bureaucratic attempts to comprehensively outline knowledge through national or state curricula and evaluate it through high-stakes testing regimes, as well as to ensure professional compliance with this project via accountability policies; and on the other hand, consumerist notions of choice that hold out the promise of complete satisfaction of educational desires through the mechanisms of marketization and “choice,” whilst interpellating an impoverished rational-individualist vision of the subject. Let’s unpack these ideas in more detail in relation to the schema of the university discourse: 1) S2 2) a (systemic knowledge: curriculum, professional standards; school choice) (‘learners’, ‘teachers’; ‘parents’) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ → \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ 4) S1 ← 3) $ (master signifiers – competition, instrumentalism, individualism) (alienated students, teachers, parents) Beginning in the upper-left quadrant, the position of agency is occupied by systemic knowledge, S2, represented by the comprehensive mapping of knowledge embodied in national/state curricula and in teacher professional standards. This systemic knowledge addresses idealized and objectified subjects in the form of the successful learner (who strives her/his best to master the curriculum and do well in examinations), the good teacher (who evinces dedication to her/his students’ learning and strives to embody the characteristics of good teaching outlined in professional standards documents) or the responsible parent (who is willing to make sacrifices to pay for her/his children’s education). In so doing, systemic knowledge projects and addresses an idealised vision of the complete, fully realised neoliberal subject. But as we have seen, such attempts at discursive colonization, involving a characteristic mixture of coercion and seduction (Bracher, 2006, p. 93), inevitably fail, with a representing the unassimilable remainder of the Lacanian real, the other, which resists co-option into the symbolic system. The resulting by-product is the alienated and split-subject, $: the disengaged student, the disaffected teacher, or the guilt-ridden parent. As with technocratic attempts at managing other aspects of public life, such attempts at comprehensive mapping inevitably fail because they strive to capture and contain that which resists such capture. Another way to think about this and the problems resulting from the dominance of the university discourse in education is in terms of Elster’s notion of states that are essentially by-products (Elster, 1983; Salacl, 1994). The idea here is that certain states of being can only be achieved indirectly and that when we attempt to attain them by making them the direct goal of our activity, we inevitably miss. Examples of such states include love, admiration, and happiness, in that we only achieve these things indirectly when we pursue other goals (Kay, 2011). I would argue that education is another example of a state that is essentially a by-product, in that education comes about indirectly as a result of engagement, inquiry and dialogue in relation to matters that are of significance and interest to its participants (Wells, 1999). Without doubt, neoliberalism’s efforts to define and manage education through performative technologies such as standards, frameworks, targets and outcomes have literally missed the point, in the process undermining and diminishing the very thing which these efforts purport to value (Biesta, 2010; Fielding & Moss, 2011; Taubman, 2009). As Rancière notes, “schooling as we know it is dependent upon a calculable if unnoticed absence of true education just as politics as we know it is most often dependent upon a similar absence of true politics” (Rancière, 2010, p. 23). But what are the alternatives? How can we put the object a, the other, back into the speaking position, the position of agency, rather the repression or colonization it suffers in the discourses of the master and the university, respectively? The Other Side of Education: Discourses of Thinking Otherwise The discourse of the master and the university are what we might describe as authoritarian discourses of mastery, insofar as both are dominated by master signifiers – whether in the place of agency, as in the discourse of the master, or in the place of truth, as in the discourse of the university. These discourses are dominated by technocratic and reductive fantasies of the instrumental, competitive, accountable and self-responsibilising educational subject. Such reductive visions offer pale imitations of the creative and critical, if unruly and imperfect (Todd, 2009), potential of the Möbius subject of education, whose liminal and paradoxical nature cannot be contained within neoliberalism’s prosaic prescriptions.

#### The alternative is to assume the position of the Analyst. This process of radical critique and questioning of the affirmative’s assumptions forces them to accept Lack. This process doesn’t preclude state action but it precedes the aff impacts.

Bracher 93 Mark (Professor at Kent State University) Lacan, Discourse and Social Change, Cornell University Press p. 68-74

It is only with the discourse of the Analyst—that the subject is in a position to assume its own alienation and desire and, on the basis of that assumption, separate from the given master signifiers and produce its own new master signifiers, that is, ideals and values less inimical to its fundamental fantasy and the desire embodied by that fantasy. It is thus the discourse of the Analyst which, according to Lacan, offers the most effective means of achieving social change by countering the psychological and social tyranny exercised through language. The discourse of the Analyst promotes psychological change by placing in the dominant position of the sender's message the a belonging to the receiver of the message or analysand—precisely what has been excluded from symbolization (XVII48) and suppressed by the discourse of the Master. In this way the discourse of the Analyst interpellates the analysand to recognize, acknowledge, and deal with this excluded portion of being, to the extent of producing a new master signifier (SI) in response to it. That is, when a person enters analysis seeking help—usually because some aspect of life is unfulfilling or painful—analysis seeks the cause of the patient's malaise (and even of apparently^ "external" problems) in an internal conflict between, on the one hand, the identity (the SI) the patient has assumed and tries to maintain, and, on the other hand, an unconscious desire for a jouis- sance (the a) that is excentric to or incommensurable with (i.e., forbid­ den by) this assumed identity. The aim of analysis is to help the patient encounter, acknowledge, identify, and finally come to identify with this excluded part of his or her being, the a. This process entails two basic steps, which Lacan refers to as alien­ ation and separation and which involve dissolving and re-forming identifications in one or more of the three registers. The schema of the discourse of the Analyst focuses on the second step, that of separation from the alienating master signifiers. But for such separation to occur, another, logically prior step must take place: identifying or "mapping" those master signifiers that constitute the alienating identifications. These two processes together can be seen as moving the analysand through the four structures of discourse identified by Lacan. Analysis often begins with the patient speaking the discourse of the University, relating personal history and reflections on that history, with knowledge occupying the position of dominance. Such discourse constitutes an attempt to cling to and consolidate one's ideal ego (the point from which one experiences oneself as lovable) by presenting oneself as someone worthy of the analyst's love and approval, a love which, were one to get it, would simply reinforce one's ideal ego by gratifying one's passive narcissistic desire and giving one a feeling of well-being.8 The analyst must refrain from providing the passive narcissistic grat­ ification that analysands seek and instead help the analysands recog­ nize the alienating effect of the ideal ego, that is, realize that everything that they like about themselves, all those attributes that they usually take as characterizing the core of their being, are to a significant degree an illusion, a sham, a travesty. With the Rat Man, for example, this would have involved his recognizing and accepting that whereas he had thought himself to be a dutiful son bearing nothing but love and respect for his father, in reality he harbored murderous aggressive impulses toward his father, as well as passionate sexual wishes for him. Where his oedipal identification (SI) established him as an honorable man, his unconscious fantasy ($ O a)—the remnant of what Freud terms the negative oedipal complex, or the son's sexual desire for his father—positioned him, we might say, as dishonorable and as a wom­ an. A fully successful analysis would have promoted separation from this ideal ego; it would have entailed his coming to recognize and acknowledge both his sadism and his homosexuality as parts of him­ self that were just as real (if not as powerful and as manifest) as his altruism and heterosexuality. Achieving this type of separation, between ego and ideal ego, occurs commonly both within analysis and outside it.9 It is at least incipient whenever there is guilt or shame—two prominent types of alienation. Outside analysis it is a phenomenon frequently found in conjunction with religious belief, in believers' sentiments that they are sinners and unworthy of God's love. Within analysis this particular sort of separa­ tion has often already occurred to a degree before the patient enters treatment, its most common form being simply the patient's feeling that something is wrong with him or her (and not just with his or her environment). Such a feeling of alienation throws into relief the sub­ ject's master signifiers—those ideals or values that the subject in this case fails to live up to—and thus constitutes the basis of mapping the subject's identifications. Such mapping, in turn, transforms the analysand's University dis­ course into a discourse of the Master, which brings the analysand's alienation to its peak and sets the stage for separation from the alienat­ ing master signifiers, which means recognizing the questionable, rela­ tive nature, and the debilitating effect, of certain values or ideals— master signifiers of the ego ideal—that one has been taking as abso­ lute. In the case of the Rat Man, this would have meant separating from the position in which having homosexual or murderous impulses is a terribld thing.10 To help the patient achieve such separation from the ego ideal, the analyst, in a sort of deconstructive moment, helps the analysand interrogate the analysand's Master discourse, the discourse of the self-identical ego, thus intensifying the alienating effect of the master signifiers until the division ($) beneath the analysand's mono­ lithic identity (SI) is experienced. In other words, the analyst works to elicit from the analysand a discourse with a hysterical structure (XVII 35), in which anxiety and a sense of emptiness or meaninglessness often dominate. In response to the analysand's hysterical discourse, the analyst does not offer the master signifier (SI) and knowledge (S2) that the analysand demands in order to assuage the anxiety and emptiness. Instead, the analyst reflects or refracts the analysand's demand in such a way as to reveal the a> cause of the analysand's desire, and thus to expose the underlying fantasy (S O a), which functions as a bedrock meaning for the analysand. The analyst, that is, responds to the hysterical element in the analysand's discourse in such a way as to illuminate and emphasize what has been left out and repressed, the a.11 Confronted with this discourse of the Analyst, the analysand, as receiver responding to his or her own a, is in position to produce a new master signifier (SI), which amounts to an alteration of the ego ideal, and this entails an altered sense of identity as well as new meanings and different values. Only by thus realizing how their present master signifiers alienate them from the a can analysands proceed to separa­ tion from the alienating position embodied in their master signifiers, the separation occurring as the analysands gradually become recon­ ciled to their repressed elements and, in fact, come to accept these as more a part of themselves than the monolithic values embodied in their ego ideal.12 This final phase of analysis includes what Lacan calls traversing the fantasy, which itself involves a third, repressed level of identification— in the case of the Wolfman (and probably also the Rat Man), the repressed identification with his mother as the passive object of his father's sexual desire. While this repressed identification with the ob­ ject a of the Other—the object of the desire or jouissance of the Other—constitutes much of the motive force for the analysand's sepa­ ration from the ideal ego and the ego ideal, the analysand must also separate from this position. This process involves the recognition of the Other's deficiency, the realization that the unconscious fantasies that have been directing one's desire and contributing to one's suffering are both relative and doomed to remain unfulfilled and, hence, that there is no transcendental meaning to be found for one's existence, no ultimate object that will satisfy one's desire, and no single, fundamen­ tal jouissance that will of itself make life worth living. To the extent that this realization is established—by the repetitious process of work­ ing through—the analysand realizes the arbitrary, ungrounded nature, with regard to the Other, of this fantasy and accepts the fantasy as his or her own particular means of jouissance. Thus at the end of analysis, Lacan says, the fundamental fantasy becomes the drive: the repressed desire for an alien jouissance embodied in the fantasy achieves a more overt and direct expression as a result of a new master signifier that accommodates the previously repressed desire. Culture and Psychological Change Given this understanding of how individual subjects are changed through the discourse of the Analyst in psychoanalytic treatment, we can now sketch out a strategy by which cultural criticism can promote social change by engaging, in a significant number of individual sub­ jects, some of the same basic processes as those operative in psychoan­ alytic treatment. Lacan himself hinted at this possibility when he indi­ cated that the position of the analyst can be assumed in relation not only to individual subjects but also to society as a whole. Taking up such a position provides the only real chance, Lacan says, to "accomplish what truly merits the tide of revolution in relation to the discourse of the Master" (XVIIA 176). This is the case because any real social change must involve not just changes in laws and public policy but alterations in the ideals, desires, and jouissances of a significant number of individual subjects—precisely the sorts of alteration that psychoanalytic treatment involves. The best thing to do to bring about revolution, Lacan suggested, is thus to be not anarchists but analysts, which means positioning oneself in such a way as to interrogate how culture participates in the position of mastery (XVIIA 176)—that is, exposing, and thus allowing subjects to work through, the knowl- edge/beliefs (S2), ideals (SI), want-of-being ($), and forbidden jouis- sance (a) that the various cultural discourses establish as dominant. The fundamental strategy of a socially transformative psychoanalytic cultural criticism, then, would be to promote, in "readers" or consumers of culture, a twofold process of alienation and separation similar to that which constitutes the transformative efficacy of psychoanalytic treatment. This means that, first of all, the cultural critic would refrain from any attempt to produce an alternative reading of a cultural artifact, alongside of or in opposition to the received read­ ing^). To offer a new reading, even a Lacanian one, of a given text or discourse would constitute a discourse of the University or a discourse of the Master that attempted to impose its beliefs (S2) or ideals (SI) on readers. (I would thus emphasize that what I will not be doing in Part II of this study is offering new or better readings of cultural artifacts per se.) What the cultural critic must interpret is not the text but rather readings of the text. The cultural critic must analyze responses to a given artifact or discourse in order (1) to map the fundamental identifications (and the concomitant desires) that are promoted in a certain number of subjects by the cultural phenomenon in question, thus emphasizing in the critic's readers the alienation entailed by these identifications, and (2) to expose the unconscious desires and fan­ tasies that the cultural phenomenon is surreptitiously operating with and/or further repressing. Such an analysis of response can promote a process of separation in the critic's readers from the alienating identi­ fications. Pursuing such a strategy entails three logical steps.

#### Analysis of desire comes first—questioning the fantasies that underpin political formulation avoids serial policy failure.

Fotaki 10 Marianna (Organization Studies Group at Manchester Business School” Why do public policies fail so often? Exploring health policy-making as an imaginary and symbolic construction” Organization 2010 17:703 Sage 713-716

Towards an alternative conception of public policy-making So far, I have suggested that health policies often fail because the fantasmatic foundations of the policy-making process are not acknowledged as such. Using the example of patient choice, I have also suggested that the reasons for its re-introduction into the UK health care system and throughout Europe, despite limited success in the past, might be better understood through applying the psychoanalytic conception of subjective fantasy. In exploring the limits and possibilities of one particular policy, my aim was to demonstrate how powerful social fantasies are created and how their splitting from organizational reality enables the idealization of the health task. Lacanian and Kleinian psychoanalysis were drawn upon to put forward the article’s key arguments and to further the understanding of the less tangible processes present in public policy making. I have brought together the mental processes that Klein has described and which were then used extensively to explain organizational phenomena, with my central argument about the (unrecognized) role of the imaginary aspects of the policy-making process. Both theories in their own unique ways highlighted the role of fantasy as a necessary stimulant for policy development but also as an impediment to its realization. I have combined the idea of fragmented subjectivity taken from Lacan’s work and socially sanctioned defences from object relations theory, to offer an alternative conception of public policy formation and to explore the reasons behind frequent policy failures. The Lacanian ontology of the subject was used to highlight the role of fantasy as an enabler of social projects. Having its roots in unconscious mental life, fantasy becomes the stimulant driving forward public policies such as patient choice, even though many of these policies are bound to fail as is the case for all imaginary projects. But failure is not necessarily seen as an adverse outcome, but rather as an opportunity to rethink the ideas of purposefulness and teleology in the context of organizations and social endeavours more generally. The Lacanian perspective introduces the productive element held in the recognition of the inevitability of failure, by unveiling the imaginary nature of striving for idealistic policies and the liberating potential of accepting loss. His conception of loss is so much more radical than in object relations theory, where mourning can bring some sort of reparation and make up for it. In Lacan’s work loss originates in the longings of the individual psyche for completeness, which is unattainable, and yet this is what sustains us as desiring subjects. If we lacked loss there would be nothing to desire. Human desire, for Lacan, is a constitutive aspect of human subjectivity and is not driven by rational considerations, as economists would like us to believe. If anything the subject is enmeshed in its imaginary constructs in order to deflect the reality of the human condition. Nor is it a desire for the promised outcome only, but rather (or also) for the symbol that the outcome stands for. Put differently, the incessant search in the subject is for the signified meaning and not for the signifier itself. I have suggested that many public policies are intrinsically idealistic as they are instigated by way of setting desire in motion. So in the case of individual choice in health, the underlying fantasy that drives this policy is the fantasy of freedom (of choice), and by extension the fantasy of control over the uncontrollable. While its stated aim is to achieve diverse (and potentially conflicting) public policy objectives, the policy reflects the contradictions of human subjectivity on a societal level as well. In other words, the patient choice paradox is that it overtly ignores the unconscious motivations implicit in the everyday reality of patient–doctor encounter (for example, by assuming that rationality over-rides patients’ fears and vulnerabilities), and yet takes (unwittingly) account of the fantasy, which is illusory but is also an indispensable aspect of our existence. The analysis moved then towards the thesis that policy tends to be idealistic because it is not meant to withstand an immediate reality test but to express mythical, imaginary and arguably unrealizable societal aspirations and longings. In this sense the discrepancies and discontinuities present in patient choice policy are but an expression of the contradictions that sustain the lack, fragmentation and splitting of the subject, and so are the unspoken, conflicting and often impossible societal tasks performed by public institutions. I have also argued that by distancing itself from operational reality, public policy making expresses societal strife and desire on a fantasy level, whilst health organizations are left in the position of a dependent subject, having passively to reflect it without being able to implement unworkable policies. For this reason, the stated objectives that choice policy is expected to achieve (such as equity and efficiency for example), may be used to deflect attention away from the need to admit the deeper defensive role of health care policy (see also Fotaki, 2006). Yet because the tacit and unspoken functions of health policy related to death anxiety and inexorable facts of life are relegated to the unconscious, they give rise to all kinds of defensive policy rhetoric by policy makers who identify with the ideals they proclaim and then feel obliged to justify them. While policy makers express societal fantasies projected onto them by their constituencies, various professional groups or patient advocates are in their own ways involved in the construction of unattainable ideals, as they too pursue and legitimize their specific projects. The role of fantasy in relation to patient choice seems obvious, but can this be generalized across all policy making processes in relation to health or other areas of public policy making? The answer is an unequivocal yes. The fantasmatic structuration of public policy making is revealed in the difficulty of accepting the limitations that are intrinsic to human predicament and ‘to give up the dream of being all, of living forever, of narcissistic omnipotence and of living in the world that never frustrates our desires’ (Moi, 2004: 869). Health and social care is about dealing with the finitude of our physical bodies. Yet these concerns are no less relevant to the education system, for example, which is unconsciously preoccupied with ensuring the survival of future generations (see Obholzer, 1994) or economic development and the idea of ‘progress’ more generally, all of which enact omnipotent fantasies of the limitless possibilities in their own distinct ways. Being a part of the symbolic order, which is structured in lack and loss, these imaginary pursuits cannot be easily (if at all) translated into workable policy objectives. But where does this all leave policy makers and how can they purposefully integrate Lacanian and Kleinian insights by bringing them to bear on policy formation and implementation? A legitimate question is: if policies are about societal fantasies that cannot be fulfilled, would this not mean that all policies are bound to fail? More fundamentally, aren’t policies meant to address real issues rather than fantasmatic pursuits that cannot be realized? These are important questions as public policies are first and foremost about addressing issues that most of us care about, and a great deal of effort goes into their design and articulation. Therefore, I would not wish to suggest that policies are not about engaging with real problems. In contrast, my proposition is that socially constructed objects of fantasy are stirred up successfully only when policies concern issues that matter. Such is the case of patient choice for example. Yet if policy-making is not to remain locked in searching for unattainable fantasms (of choice for all), originating in the imaginary reflections of the illusory self, we would have to recognize them for what they are. If, on the other hand, we carry on mis-taking them for reality, they will continue to mirror the misrecognized vision of ourselves and our society. The unique strength of psychoanalytic thought is that it demonstrates the injustice towards the other and alienation of the subject whenever we cling to impossible fantasies originating in the imaginary (Leeb, 2008). The emancipatory potential of psychoanalysis on the other hand, lies in its power to highlight (and dispel) the imaginary nature of the subjective drive for unity, certainty and stability which underpins various societal projects. But psychoanalysis does not only warn us about the consequences of mistaking the infinite desires of the psyche with the finitude of human bodies. More crucially it acknowledges the productive role of fantasy, and of its failure, in the social arena. In so doing, psychoanalysis presents us with a way of bridging fantasy with reality in our social and political endeavors. The incorporation of psychoanalytic insights, I have suggested, as a necessary means for rethinking health policy making, is not meant to supplant economic and political explanations of social and organizational life. Instead it is offered to elucidate the co-existence and subtle interplay between psychic mechanisms and calculating rationality that policy makers, politicians, professionals and users of services rely on to make their decisions. Both theories of Lacanian and Kleinian psychoanlaysis drawn upon in this article imply the necessity of recognizing underlying imaginary dynamics as a starting point in the journey towards realistic policy-making. To do so we need firstly to accept the imaginary structuration of the desire to attain the unattainable. This recognition will lead to an acknowledgement and acceptance of the intrinsic instability and conflicting nature of the policy-making process, overcoming the splits between policy design and implementation. In addition to political and financial constraints, policies are simultaneously driven (and limited) by the ambiguity and non-unified subjectivity of those who design them and the users/beneficiaries who are themselves split, enigmatic and multi-dimensional subjects. Such a policy, which is reflective of its context and of itself, would not easily be drawn into seeking simplistic ‘solutions’ reflecting the fantasies of the ego. It would also not become the mirror showing our deepest socially sanctioned desires/fantasies, that we are then encouraged to enact mindlessly. As I have shown, the rhetorical pronouncements of ‘Choice for All’ for example, stand for an injunction to exercise and enjoy (choice) even if it involves the experience of being ill or cared for. The call for the recognition of the fantasmatic structuration of the policy process does not however suggest a blank slate authorization of policies designed without thought as to how they can (not) be implemented in a complex multi-organization such as the National Health Service. As I have argued, when policies are conceived at ‘a distance’ from organizational reality, they cannot relate to patient requirements and cannot be translated into organizational realities. This brings me to my second and more important point, about the necessity of re-considering policy-making processes, as an inclusive process involving those who are concerned with policy implementation: health professionals, and users of services. By engaging users and providers in decision-making and the co-production of services as self-aware subjects rather than as constituencies whose fantasies can be manipulated, there might be a possibility to break through the cycle of policy repetition and blame apportioning. More importantly, reconciling failure as an opportunity that keeps desire alive rather than an outcome to be avoided might create an opening for more realistic policy formation. This in itself is a depressing process as one must also give up the idealized objects, accepting the impossibility of ever attaining them. Yet only by accepting the necessity of Samuel Beckett’s injunction to: ‘Try again. Fail again. Fail better’ (Beckett, 1983: 7) may the process of un-encumbering oneself from the ideals that bind our ego begin. A participative policy making process that bridges fantasy and reality is a first step in such a direction. It would foster an engagement of self-aware subjects accepting the burden of their subjectivity and taking responsibility for their ontological predicament without surrendering to it, rather than a responsibilization of individual users of services or professionals. By re-considering the very idea of policy as grounded in an imaginary projection of a soon to be perfect world, we would have to learn to stop demanding such perfection of our politicians, and they would have to stop believing that they could deliver it. The comprehensive interpretation of policy-making at a societal level and through the lens of organizational defences suggested in this article might contribute to a better understanding of the possibilities and limitations of developing patients’ autonomy, beyond normalizing the ‘management of expectations’. It will also challenge a linear model of policy-making and policy analysis, which separates design from its implementation, showing it to be inadequate. But for this to happen, the unconscious motivations that create and undo policies will have to be appreciated. Taking into account the inevitability of fantasy in policy-making and the inevitability of its failure, may not free us once and for all from the tyranny of imaginary pursuits. It might, however, enable a journey towards the discovery of new ways of desiring, engaging and being in organizations and society.

### Link—Critical Theory

#### The aff’s use of critical theory is the perfect example of the University discourse—it’s a machine constantly grouping and explaining cultural phenomena in terms of pre-existing categories—the result isn’t emancipation, but rather the destruction of individual subjectivity resulting from the inability of language to describe reality.

Bryant 12 Levi R. (Collin College, TX) “Critical Theory and University Discourses” December 12th 2012 Larval Subjects <https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/12/12/critical-theory-and-university-discourses/> JW

So what sort of relation is at work in university discourses? On the upper right hand we see the following relation: S2 —> a. In this context, we can read “knowledge” addressing an individual that is new and unknown. We might think of S2, for example, as the system of diagnostic categories in the DSM-IV. A person walks into a psychiatric clinic (the other, the unknown). The person describes what they’re suffering from: repetitive washing of the hands, fear that they are being watched, inability to get out of the bed, whatever. The psychiatrist now consults the DSM-IV and subsumes the person under the category of obsessional neurosis, paranoia, or depression. The symptoms are indexed to a system of categories or “knowledge” (S2). The case is similar when you fill out a form for Uncle Sam or the government. You’re given a list of options for your sex, ethnicity, and religion (S2) and must subsume yourself (objet a) under one of these categories. Likewise, in bad psychoanalysis, we get a university discourse in the sense that we always know (S2) that the patient will be suffering from an Oedipus complex, fear of castration, etc. Every new analysand learns exactly the same thing (S2) with only the details of the stories of castration and Oedipus changing. Another good example is Zizek’s work. We think we’re before an analyst’s discourse, but instead we’re before a machine that monotonously finds the same thing, again and again, in whatever cultural artifact he investigates. Far from an encounter with the enigma of something new, we instead have the endless subsumption of all things to his theoretical machine. We know exactly what we’re going to find: “the standard interpretation is x, but it is really y.” We can basically call the “university discourse” what Kuhn called “normal science“. In “normal science” we don’t get a new theory, but rather we get the progressive subsumption of unexplained phenomena (objet a) under the “paradigm” (S2) or existing system of explanation and categorization. Marco Polo mentions that unicorns do, in fact, exist; they just have grey skin, two horns, are rather ugly and ill tempered, etc. He’s referring to his encounter with the rhinoceros. Marco Polo is here working in a university discourse, subsuming a new entity under the paradigm of animal classification he had available to him at the time. The comparison of the university discourse to normal science should disabuse us of the notion that university discourses are intrinsically bad things. A lot of new knowledge is produced through these things. They can be positive practices and debilitating ones. Nonetheless, the foregoing gives a sense of why we see “$”, the matheme for the barred or alienated subject, appear in the place of the product of these discourses. In being passed through the sieve of S2, of the system of explanation or categories, objet a, the new case, is alienated in that system. It is not objet a that is generating new knowledge, but rather it is simply being subsumed under the existing system of categories as yet one more instance of a kind. This comes out clearly in the case of our discussion of the psychiatric clinic and bad psychoanalysis. The person (objet a) comes in, talks about their symptoms, and is immediately indexed to a diagnostic category in the DSM-IV. That category is then indexed to a particular treatment such as a suggested medication or course of therapy. What hasn’t happened is the speech of the patient. The patient hasn’t been given a space to articulate the meaning behind their symptom because that “meaning” is already assumed. What would the patient have to offer? Anything they say about, for example, their sense of being watched is immediately subsumed under the category of paranoia (the thought that this could be a hysterical form of desire is never even entertained). Hence they are “divided”– $ –from themselves and alienated in the system of categories. The DSM-IV always already knows. There can never be a question of a case that would disrupt or fundamentally fail to fit with that system of categorization and explanation. The same is true with bad psychoanalysis. Whatever the analysand says, the analyst always already knows that it will be a case of castration and the Oedipus. All enunciations, all symptoms, are immediately indexed to the family drama. We thus see why S1 appears in the position of truth in the university discourse. It is the unconscious of this discourse. S1 is the signifier for power, mastery, completeness, the father, God, the master, etc. It is a being or signifier that would somehow manage to escape the diacritical play of signifiers and ground identity and a foundation absolutely. S1 appears in the position of truth for two reasons: First, discourses of the university always seem to refer to some master figure (S1) that functions as the foundation of the discourse and its guarantee: Freud, Lacan, Marx, Adorno, Deleuze and Guattari, Einstein, etc. The master is uncastrated or truly knows (the relationship between God and the claims of the Bible, for example), and therefore the system of categories cannot be mistaken. Yet if the relationship to the master must be in the place of the unconscious, then this is because the system of knowledge (S2) must present itself as objective and impartial. It can’t make an appeal to authority to ground itself because then it would reveal its circularity. But more fundamentally, S1 appears in the place of truth, the unconscious, then this is because university discourses are generally premised on a will to mastery, control, and power. Lacan liked to say that we have a desire for ignorance, that we don’t want to know anything about “it”. What we really want is a world where all the pegs fit in the holes and there’s nothing noisy or aleatory. We certainly don’t want to listen to objet a and allow it to disrupt our S2. When I hear Mark Nelson and Bogost claim that critical theory uses well worn theory to reach expected conclusions, I hear them basically saying that critical theories are all too often university discourses. Far from being emancipatory, far from surprising us, we instead know exactly what we’re going to find: that x is “ontotheological”, or x is animated by a “sickening jouissance”, or that x is a neoliberal capitalist ploy, or that x is a form of religious superstition, or that x is this, or this, or this, or this. We begin from the premise that whatever cultural phenomena we encounter, whatever artifact we encounter, etc., is already subsumable under our categories and explanatory frameworks (S2). And inevitably, this is premised on some fidelity to a master (S1) and will to power (S1) in a world that is pretty chaotic (objet a). In a move that is worthy of Laruelle (one of the latest S1’s), we can say that critical theory perpetually posits the being of the real and is endlessly caught in a form of analysis based on its own arbitrary decision ultimately based on fidelity to a master; a fidelity that thoroughly contradicts the rejection of mastery taught by all of these figures. With the exception of true Lacanians like Guattari, for example, we seldom do what these masters themselves did: listen to objet a, to the unassimilated, as the only source of knowledge rather than subsuming it under a category. We seldom surrender mastery and open a space where we might be surprised and discover that something very different is going on. Instead, we always already know what we’re going to find as a function of our critical apparatus. Yet the worst thing about this sort of theoretical practice is that, like the fundamentalist Catholic theologians, it seems obsessed with finding sin everywhere. Everything must be shown to be dirty. Everything must shown to be compromised. Seldom do we encounter a form of practice that is for something. Indeed, the very act of being for something is seen as naive and suspect.

### Extensions

The 1AC is a perfect example of what Lacan calls the University discourse. Aspiring policy-makers like the aff create a normative vision for society and then use it to justify political decisions. In reality, this is a veiled attempt to gain mastery of the public by imposing their will upon others. The aff has attempted to become the Master of society by calling the shots. Think of this kind of like a kritik of roleplaying, but different. That’s Schroeder 02.

There are a few impacts:

1. The expansion of the University discourse destroys value to life by turning the agential subject into an object. Expert knowledge uses the Master Signifier to turn multi-faceted people into the “effective policy-maker,” or “good teacher” which rips humanity of the content that cannot be described just by words. That’s Clarke 12.

2. Education—attempts to engage in specific institutions or create regulatory maps for what debate must look like through being a “policy-maker” destroys education, which naturally arises out of spontaneous dialogue. Neoliberalism’s frameworks for establishing what education is destroy the value of our activity. That’s also Clarke 12.

3. Serial policy failure. This is why the K comes prior and precedes your evaluation of any of the aff impacts. Without justifying the psychoanalytic foundations of your performance, there is no guarantee that your policy action is actually a good thing. The Fotaki 10 evidence is incredibly specific. The main reason for policy failure is not acknowledging the psychoanalytic underpinnings of policy-making and pretending like we should control others through our actions. For example, the idea of ‘progress’ in society is a vapid and meaningless signifier that becomes part of the symbolic order and prevents policies from actualizing real change. The kritik is the starting-point for policy-making and controls the link to all of your offense. If they lose the link debate, vote negative on presumption independent of the alternative because they haven’t justified a fundamental premise of the AC.

The alternative is to assume the position of the Analyst. That’s Bracher 93. Only the Analyst can provide any hope for reducing oppression by reappropriating master-signifiers to become more reflexive. Social change has to be performed through psychoanalysis because a complex economy of desires constitutes the way we relate to each other—not just systems and laws. That means the alternative is sufficient to solve 100% of the links so there’s no net benefit to the permutation and you vote on a risk of a disad.

### AT: Perm

#### 1. Severs out of the 1AC’s representations if I win the link evidence which is a voting issue because I can’t hold the aff to anything stable for a fair and educational debate.

#### 2. University DA. The permutation is just another lie of the University, denying the performative element of the 1AC and its justification in dominance. This inevitably results in more biopolitical control.

Zizek 4 Slavoj”From Politics to Biopolitics…and Back” The South Atlantic Quarterly 103.2/3 (2004) 501-521<http://estia.media.uoa.gr/main/eng/events/zizek_politics.pdf> JW

The university discourse is enunciated from the position of "neutral" Knowledge; it addresses the remainder of the real (say, in the case of pedagogical knowledge, the "raw, uncultivated child"), turning it into the subject ($). The "truth" of the university discourse, hidden beneath the bar, of course, is power, i.e. the Master-Signifier: the constitutive lie of the university discourse is that it disavows its performative dimension, presenting what effectively amounts to a political decision based on power as a simple insight into the factual state of things. What one should avoid here is the Foucauldian misreading: the produced subject is not simply the subjectivity which arises as the result of the disciplinary application of knowledge-power, but its remainder, that which eludes the grasp of knowledge-power. "Production" (the fourth term in the matrix of discourses) does not stand simply for the result of the discursive operation, but rather for its "indivisible remainder", for the excess which resists being included in the discursive network, i.e. for what the discourse itself produces as the foreign body in its very heart. Perhaps the exemplary case of the Master's position which underlies the university discourse is the way in which medical discourse functions in our everyday lives: at the surface level, we are dealing with pure objective knowledge which desubjectivizes the subject-patient, reducing him to an object of research, of diagnosis and treatment; however, beneath it, one can easily discern a worried hystericized subject, obsessed with anxiety, addressing the doctor as his Master and asking for reassurance from him. At a more common level, suffice it to recall the market expert who advocates strong budgetary measures (cutting welfare expenses, etc.) as a necessity imposed by his neutral expertise devoid of any ideological biases: what he conceals is the series of power-relations (from the active role of state apparatuses to ideological beliefs) which sustain the "neutral" functioning of the market mechanism. In the University discourse, is not the upper level ($ – a) that of biopolitics (in the sense deployed from Foucault to Agamben)? Of the expert knowledge dealing with its object which is a - not subjects, but individuals reduced to bare life? And does the lower not designate what Eric Santner called the »crisis of investiture,« i.e., the impossibility of the subject to relate to S1, to identify with a Master-Signifier, to assume the imposed symbolic mandate? 2 The key point is here that the expert rule of »biopolitics« is grounded in and conditioned by the crisis of investiture; this crisis generated the "post-metaphysical" survivalist stance of the Last Men, which ends up in an anemic 5 spectacle of life dragging on as its own shadow. It is within this horizon that one should appreciate today's growing rejection of death penalty: what one should be able to discern is the hidden "biopolitics" which sustains this rejection. Those who assert the “sacredness of life,” defending it against the threat of transcendent powers which parasitize on it, end up in a world in which, on behalf of its very official goal – long pleasurable life – all effective pleasures are prohibited or strictly controlled (smoking, drugs, food…). Spielberg's Saving Private Ryan is the latest example of this survivalist attitude towards dying, with its "demystifying" presentation of war as a meaningless slaughter which nothing can really justify - as such, it provides the best possible justification for the Colin Powell's "no-casualties-on-our-side" military doctrine.

#### 3. Cooption DA. Only the Analyst can reduce oppression—constantly questioning, resisting, and revolutionizing against the University and master discourse. Anything else allows harmful master signifiers.

Clarke 12 Matthew (Professor at University of New South Wales) “The Other Side of Education: A Lacanian Critique of Neoliberal Education Policy” Other Education: The Journal of Education Alternatives, Volume 1 Issue 1 p. 46-60 <http://www.othereducation.org/index.php/OE/article/view/27> JW

It is only in the discourse of the analyst that the totality and tyranny of the master signifiers is at least partially broken – partially that is because the analyst’s discourse still involves the operation of master signifiers, but with the critical difference that these are more flexible and tentative, being products of the subject of knowledge rather than being imposed upon it (Bracher, 1994, p. 124). The discourse of the analyst, which stands in opposition and counterpoint to the closure and rigidity of the master’s discourse, is represented schematically below: 1) a \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ 4) S2 2) $ → \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ ← 3) S1 In the discourse of the analyst, surplus desire, a, the other – which was repressed in the master’s discourse and colonized in the university discourse – addresses the divided subject, $. In part because it is underpinned by knowledge, S2, occupying the place of truth, recognizes how the latter’s subjection to the signifier produces the split between conscious symbolic knowledge and unconscious desire. Meanwhile, the reinscription of the a, that was excluded in the master’s discourse and colonized in the university discourse, into the place of agency enables the subject to produce new master signifiers, S1, and hence to disrupt and challenge the dominance of the master’s discourse: The analytic discourse, that is, makes it possible to produce a master signifier that is a little less oppressive...less absolute, exclusive and rigid in its establishment of the subject’s identity, and more open, fluid, processual – constituted, in a word, by relativity and textuality. (Bracher, 1994, p. 124) In educational policy terms, this means rethinking the purposes of education in ways that more open and exploratory and less closed and certain, more expressive and intrinsic and less instrumental and extrinsic; it means thinking how educational relationships might become more democratic and egalitarian in orientation and less managerial and hierarchical (Fielding & Moss, 2011, p. 68). It means thinking how education can be rethought more in terms of a collaborative adventure and less as a competitive race. It means placing more emphasis on the virtues of interconnections and less on the tyranny of choice. In pedagogic practice terms, this means not requiring students to conform to some pre-established body of knowledge, whether traditional, progressive, or critical. Rather, it entails assisting students to recognize the nature and origins of their existing knowledge and identities (including imagistic-perceptual and affective-physiological, not just linguistic-discursive registers), to build new knowledge and identities in proximal or potential zones of development, and to understand the implications and consequences of particular knowledge and identities for themselves and for others (Bracher, 2006, pp. 103-105). Such an approach, combining constructive and deconstructive approaches, echoes Biesta’s argument “that education, as distinguished from socialization, that is, from the insertion of newcomers into an existing order, entails a responsibility for the coming into the world of unique, singular beings” (Biesta, 2006, p. 115). Returning to our earlier discussion, such an approach is appropriate to the nature of the Möbius subject, who is at once individual and social, whose extimate origins are both external and immanent, whose excessive constitution retains an unassimilable kernel of the unknowable real, the other, alongside its more visible imaginary and symbolic dimensions. This Möbius educational subject’s simultaneous and paradoxical embodiment of singularity, plurality, and difference exposes the inadequacies of an education grounded in discourses of mastery and instead demands engagement with the other side of education.

### AT: Robinson (conservatism)

**Robinson misdiagnoses Lacanian politics as conservatism – it doesn’t precluded any social progress, just the universalizability and guarantee of progress as complete**

**Thomassen 04** [Lasse Thomassen, Department of Government, University of Essex, THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, November 2004, v. 6 n. 4, p. 558, http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2004.00157.x?cookieSet=1]

(3) According to Robinson, Lacanian political theory is inherently conservative. ‘Lacanians’, Robinson writes, ‘urge that one reconcile oneself to the inevitability of lack. Lacanian politics is therefore about coming to terms with violence, exclusion and antagonism, not about resolving or removing these’ (p. 260). And, about Mouffe, he writes that, ‘as a Lacanian, Mouffe cannot reject exclusion; it is, on a certain level, necessary according to such a theory’ (p. 263). Such assertions are only possible if we believe in the possibility of opposing exclusion to a situation of non-exclusion, which is exactly what post-structuralists have challenged. Moreover, the post-structuralist (and Lacanian) view does not necessarily preclude the removal of any concrete exclusion. On the contrary, the acknowledgement of the constitutivity of exclusion shifts the focus from exclusion versus non-exclusion to the question of which exclusions we can and want to live with. Nothing in the poststructuralist (and Lacanian) view thus precludes a progressive politics. Of course, this is not to say that a progressive politics is guaranteed—if one wants guarantees, post-structuralist political theory is not the place to look. There are similar problems with Robinson’s characterisation of Zizek’s ‘nihilistic variety of Lacanianism’: ‘the basic structure of existence is unchangeable ... Zizek’s Lacanian revolutionism must stop short of the claim that a better world can be constructed’ (p. 267). This, according to Robinson, ‘reflects an underlying conservatism apparent in even the most radical-seeming versions of Lacanianism’ (p. 268). Again, the constitutivity of exclusion and violence does not necessarily mean that ‘the new world cannot be better than the old’ (p. 268). The alternative to guaranteed progress is not necessarily conservatism or nihilism, and the impossibility of a perfect society does not exclude attempts at improvement—with the proviso that what counts as improvement cannot be established according to some transcendental yardstick.

### AT: Non-Falsifiable

**1. No impact – even if you can’t prove us wrong doesn’t disprove our warrants - we are saying that if you adopt the paradigm of the truth of our arguments that you can solve for forms of violence and that’s good**

**2. Most social sciences are non-falsifiable – under their interpretation the only thing we could debate about is physics and chemistry – they don’t meet either**

**3. It is falsifiable – scientific studies prove**

**Berlin 09** [Heather A. Berlin, neuroscientist focusing on brain-behavior relationships affecting the prevention and treatment of psychiatric disorders and Christof Koch. “Defense Mechanisms: Neuroscience Meets Psychoanalysis.” April 13, 2009. <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=neuroscience-meets-psychoanalysis>]

Advances in technologies such as functional magnetic resonance imaging permit scientists to directly measure brain activity. This ability has led to a revival and reconceptualization of key psychoanalytic concepts, based on the idea of inner forces outside our awareness that influence our behavior. According to psychodynamic theory, unconscious dynamic processes defensively remove anxiety-provoking thoughts and impulses from consciousness in response to our conflicting attitudes. The processes that keep unwanted thoughts from entering consciousness are known as defense mechanisms and include repression, suppression and dissociation. Suppression is the voluntary form of repression proposed by Sigmund Freud in 1892. It is the conscious process of pushing unwanted, anxiety-provoking thoughts, memories, emotions, fantasies and desires out of awareness. Suppression is more amenable to controlled experiments than is repression, the unconscious process of excluding painful memories, thoughts and impulses from consciousness. If you are grieving over the death of a loved one or the breakup of a relationship, you may consciously decide to suppress thinking about the situation to get on with your life. Or, in another example, you may have an impulse to tell your boss what you really think about him and his abysmal behavior, but you suppress this thought because you need the job. In both cases, the desire is conscious but is thwarted by the exercise of willpower resulting from a rational decision to avoid the action. The impulse or drive may display itself in other ways, however: you may develop a nervous cough around your boss even though you are not sick. Or a suppressed sexual desire may resurface in a careless phrase or slip of the tongue. In general, “forgotten” thoughts, memories and urges can influence behaviors, conscious thoughts and feelings and can express themselves as symptoms or even as mental illness. Although some claim that suppression is a psychoanalytical myth with no scientific support, fMRI data suggest otherwise. Psychologist Michael C. Anderson, now at St. Andrews University in Scotland, and his colleagues carried out what they call a “think/no-think” experiment to explore the brain basis of memory suppression. Two dozen volunteers had to memorize 48 word pairs (for example, ordeal-roach or steam-train). Subsequently, while lying in a scanner, subjects were shown the first cue word and had to either recall the second, associated word (called the respond condition) or prevent it from entering consciousness (suppress condition). Actively suppressing the matched word while lying in the scanner had the effect of reducing recall of the word afterward (as compared with the respond condition); this result is not just simple forgetting that occurs with the passage of time. The imaging data that Anderson and his colleagues collected showed that the volunteers suppressed the words by recruiting parts of the brain involved in “executive control,” namely, areas in the prefrontal cortex, to disengage processing in sectors of the brain important for memory formation and retrieval, in particular the hippocampus. This finding is noteworthy because earlier experiments showed that the amplitude of activity in the hippocampus is proportional to memory recall—the stronger the activity, the higher the likelihood of remembering. A second intriguing observation is that the brain is more active when avoiding recalling a memory than during recall itself. People suppress unwanted memories by exerting willful effort that can be tracked in the nervous system in ways only dreamed of by Freud—who was, after all, a neuroscientist by training.